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1. INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behavior benefits recipients, 
but often costs the giver (Simpson and Willer, 
2008). The emergence of prosocial behavior 
is described with indirect fitness benefit from 
the biological perspective (Hamilton, 1964), 
whereas the social perspective is based on con-
tinuity of consecutive stages of development 
(Piaget, 1997) and corresponding acquisition 
of social norms and rules (Kolberg, 1974; 
Rest et al., 2000). Firstly, both perspectives 
lack consistent view of altruism toward other 
species. The help to other species by humans 
without obvious return may be an indicator 
of rule-guided moral behavior. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the biological and social 
considerations of the development of proso-
cial behavior still lack unequivocal integrity.
The acquisition of moral rules can be 
considered within cognitive development 
(Kolberg, 1974, Piaget, 1997, Rest et al., 
2000), whereas the prerequisites for such 
learning may hinge on phylogenetic adapta-
tions, including those formed via kin or group 
selection (Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975). Ac-
cordingly, kin-selection has been considered 
as an important foundation for the emergence 
and strengthening the ‘higher levels’ of coop-
eration in evolution (e.g. West et al., 2007a). 
Therefore, prosocial behavior toward related 
or unrelated group members may have arisen 
at certain consecutive stages of phylogeny. 
This succession can be revealed with 
moral decisions concerning close or distant 
others (Passini, 2016). Thus, we hypothesized 
that an individual would support more closely 
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related group members at the early stages of 
ontogeny (as a more basic strategy of behav-
ior), whereas more distinguished moral rules 
would emerge at the later stages. In the latter 
case, the rules of fairness would be applied not 
only to relatives (in-group members), but also 
to members of a less related group (out-group 
members).
Our hypothesis has initially been built on 
the basic theoretical framework of the system-
evolutionary theory (Shvyrkov, 1986). From 
this perspective, a new behavior is subserved 
by co-activation of systems that had emerged 
during episodes of learning at successive stag-
es of ontogenesis (Quintana, 1998; Arutyu-
nova et al., 2013). A system elaborated during 
learning is a set of brain and body elements 
activity of which provides resultative interac-
tion with the environment (Anokhin, 1974). 
A new form of behavior is based on simul-
taneous activation of newly formed system 
together with successively acquired systems 
that constitute prior experience. Therefore, the 
stage-wise description of the social attitudes 
development may contribute to elaboration of 
moral education principles.
In this study we compared moral deci-
sions of children from 3 to 11 years old. The 
children evaluated actions in moral dilemmas 
presenting a choice between helping a human 
who captures a desirable resource for extra 
benefit (labeled as an ‘aggressor’), and help-
ing someone (humans, animals, or aliens) who 
has already been using this resource and needs 
it for survival (labeled as a ‘victim’).
The goal of this study is to investigate 
the emergence of new rule-guided forms of 
behavior and their prerequisite adaptations. 
We hypothesize that the attitudes develop 
from helping humans (as the basic and more 
ancient strategy of behavior) to helping non-
humans through learning rules of fairness and 
justice within a culture and generalizing them 
to other creatures. Since these attitudes reflect 
corresponding moral rules, we also propose 
that the actions of human aggressors would 
be evaluated less positively by older children 
than by the younger children.
To our knowledge the behavior of hu-
mans who are forced to choose between an in-
stinctive support of an in-group member and 
the preference based on moral rules has not 
been studied before. If the society invests in 
the deployment of the support, it is important 
to know what becomes of it during ontogeny. 
This study may also contribute to greater in-
tegration between empirical and theoretical 
work on altruism and prosocial behavior from 
the evolutionary perspective, of which there 
are only few examples (Leimar and Hammer-
stein, 2006).
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Participants
The participants were 80 Russian pre- 
and elementary schoolchildren (36 female), 
from 3 to 11 years old. We formed the follow-
ing groups: 3–4 years old (N=15), 5–6 years 
old (N=24), 7–9 (N=24), 10–11 (N=17) (see 
Table 1).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the 
age groups.
Parents were given full information 
and signed informed consent regarding the 
research and participation of their children. 
All procedures performed in studies involving 
human participants were was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of Federal State-Financed 
Institution, Institute of psychology of Russian 
Academy of Science.
2.2. Task
Children were asked to assess moral 
dilemmas representing situations where a hu-
man child (in-group member) benefited from 
harmful actions toward other characters (out-
group members). The question was ‘Who 
would you help?’. Helping a human child 
would deprive an out-group member of vi-
tal resources, whereas helping an out-group 
individual would deprive the human child of 
a benefit. The out-group characters were do-
mestic animals (dogs), wild animals (squir-
rels), or aliens. An additional dilemma repre-
sented a choice between two humans.  Each 
participant was presented with four dilemmas 
contrasting a victim and an aggressor. Each 
dilemma was illustrated with three color pic-
tures (90*85 mm) showing the two conflicting 
characters and the resource. The pictures were 
shown along with oral presentation of the di-
lemmas. One of the dilemmas is given below:
There is a glade in the forest. Squirrels 
live in this glade. They eat and play there. 
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Squirrels are very afraid of humans, so they 
cannot live with them. Vanya wants to build a 
large house in this glade for his family because 
he has a very large family. Currently, they live 
in a very small house, which is uncomfortable. 
If Vanya builds a large house, squirrels would 
not live and play in this glade, as they would 
have nothing to eat; however, Vanya will have 
a large house for his family. Who would you 
like to help, the squirrels, so they can stay in 
this glade, or Vanya, so that he can build a 
large house for his family?
Additionally, we presented a control di-
lemma with a conflict between an animal and 
a human where the human could be deprived 
of a vital resource. In the latter dilemma, all 
participants chose to help the human.
Two sets of dilemmas were formed to 
control for the order of the presentation of 
characters (in the example above, the victim 
is introduced first). The order of the dilemmas 
in each set was randomized. Only one set was 
presented to each participant. No difference 
of choice frequencies between the sets was 
found (Fisher’s exact test; p=.240 for ‘Alien’ 
dilemma; p=.285 for ‘Wild animal’ dilem-
ma; p=.429 for ‘Domestic animal’ dilemma; 
p=.594 for ‘Human’ dilemma). Therefore, the 
results of the two sets were combined.
The goal of the study was revealed to 
the participants when the interviews with all 
of the children had been completed.
2.3. Research design and procedure
Children were individually interviewed 
at school in a separate room. First, the experi-
menter became acquainted with the children 
and asked them about their families, friends, 
hobbies, and so forth. Then the children were 
given moral dilemmas and questioned about 
each of them. To assess the moral evaluation 
of aggressor’s actions in the dilemmas, the 
participants were presented with a 5-point 
Likert-type scale after each dilemma. The rat-
ings ranged from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’ 
and were labeled with smiling, sad, or neutral 
faces, as done elsewhere (e.g. Smetana, 1981). 
The interviews were audio-recorded.
For purposes beyond the scope of this 
article, we used a wireless device measuring 
heart rate in 34 participants (3–8 years old,20 
female). After moral dilemmas these partici-
pants performed other psychological tests (not 
related to moral development). The moral de-
cisions were not affected by these manipula-
tions (Fisher’s exact test, p=.590 for ‘Alien 
dilemma’; p=.430 for ‘Wild animal’ dilem-
ma; p=.554 for ‘Domestic animal’ dilemma; 
p=.288 for ‘Human’ dilemma). Therefore, 
both subsets of data were analyzed as a single 
sample.
2.4. Measures
Participants’ choices to help a victim or 
to help an aggressor were coded as ‘1’ or ‘0’, 
correspondingly. The average of these (i.e. the 
frequency of choosing victims) served as an 
‘index of help’ for each participant. The mor-
al evaluations of human actions were coded 
from 1 (‘very bad’) to 5 (‘very good’). Two 
average scores were calculated for each par-
ticipant: evaluations of aggressor’s action giv-
en after helping a victim were averaged sepa-
rately from those after helping an aggressor. 
The frequencies of choices for each dilemma 
were compared between the groups with Fish-
er’s exact test. The correlations between the 
index of help, the average evaluation ratings, 
and age were assessed with a non-parametric 
Spearman’s coefficient. The differences were 
considered significant at p<.05.
3. RESULTS
No gender differences were found in 
the dilemma scores or the evaluations within 
either groups or dilemma (dilemmas scores: 
Fisher’s exact test, p=.481; p=.158; p=.613; 
p=.265; evaluations of actions: Mann-Whit-
ney test, U=767.5, p=.946; U=646.5, p=.202; 
U=685, p=.345; U=752.5, p=.856 for the 
‘Alien’, ‘Wild animal’, ‘Domestic animal’, 
and ‘Human’ dilemmas, correspondingly). 
Therefore, the scores of boys and girls were 
joined together.
3.1. Moral decisions
The choices made by the participants in 
each dilemma were presented as frequencies 
of victim preference (Figure 1). The differ-
ences in these frequencies between the groups 
were revealed in all of the dilemmas, whereas 
the age of significant increase in preference of 
a victim increased as the degree of relatedness 
to the victim decreased – the less related the 
victim, the later the age of significant increase. 
Thus, in the ‘Human’ dilemma, the differenc-
es between the scores of the 3–4 and 5–6 age 
groups were significant (Fisher’s exact test; 
p=.049), as well as between the 3–4 and 7–9 
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age groups, and the 7–9 and 10–11 age groups 
(p=.003 and p=.036). The significant increase 
of victim preference occurred at a later age in 
the dilemmas with animals, with the differenc-
es between the scores of the 3–4 and 7–9 age 
groups being significant (Fisher’s exact test; 
p=.005 in the ‘Domestic animal’ dilemma, 
and p=.025 in the ‘Wild animal’), along with 
the difference between the 3–4 and 10–11 age 
groups (p=.015 and p=.004, correspondingly). 
In the ‘Alien’ dilemma, the difference was ob-
tained between even more distant groups — 
3–4 and 10–11 (p=.040), as well as between 
the 5–6 and 10–11 (p=.019).
Accordingly, significant differences 
from a random distribution (assessed with 
Chi-square criterion) were observed in dif-
ferent age groups depending on the dilem-
ma. The distributions of decisions in ‘Hu-
man’ (χ²=10,67, p=0,001), ‘Domestic animal’ 
(χ²=16,67, p<0,0001), and ‘Wild animal’ 
(χ²=13,5, p<0,0005) dilemmas were differ-
ent from random in the group of 5–6 year 
olds), whereas the distribution of decisions 
in the ‘Alien’ dilemma became different from 
random only in 10–11 year olds (χ²=7,12; 
p=0,008). However, in the ‘Human’ dilemma, 
the decrease of the victim support in the group 
of 10–11 year olds has lead this difference to 
the level of tendency (χ²=2,88; p=0,09). No 
significant differences were observed in the 
group of 3–4 year olds. 
Figure 1. The frequencies of victim sup-
port in the moral dilemmas (‘Human, ‘Domes-
tic animal’, ‘Wild animal’, and ‘Alien’) for age 
groups of 3–4, 5–6, 7–9, and 10–11 years old. 
*Fisher’s exact test, p<.05. **Fisher’s exact 
test, p<.01. # Chi-square criterion, p < 0,05.
3.2. Evaluations of actions
Due to technical problems, evaluations 
from four participants were not recorded. The 
remaining data had the following group con-
tent: 3–4 years (N=15), 5–6 years (N=23), 7–9 
years (N=22), 10–11 years (N=16).
The ‘index of help’ was found to be posi-
tively correlated with age (R=0,46; p<0,0001) 
and negatively correlated with the evaluations 
of aggressor’s actions after helping a victim 
(R=-0,27; p=0,016; Figure 2), but not after 
helping an aggressor (R=0,01; p=0,938).
Figure 2. Decrease of average of the 
evaluations with increase of ‘index of help’ 
through ontogenesis. X-line: age groups — 
3–4 year olds; 5–6 year olds; 7–9 year olds; 
10–11 year olds. Solid line shows the dynam-
ics of ‘index of help’. Dotted line shows the 
dynamics of the evaluations of aggressor’s ac-
tions (mean values).
The evaluations of aggressor’s actions 
after helping an aggressor were found to be 
negatively correlated with age on the level of 
tendency (R=-0,281; p=0,05). We also found a 
correlation between the ‘index of help’ and the 
average evaluation rating for each group taken 
separately, except the group of 3–4 year olds 
(R=-.287; p=.299 for 3–4 group; R=-.477; 
p=.018 for 5–6 group; R=-.686; p<.0005 for 
7–9 group; R=-.558; p=.020 for 10–11 group). 
Notably, children who helped out-group mem-
bers tended to evaluate human actions as ‘bad’ 
or ‘very bad’, whereas children who helped 
aggressors tended to evaluate human actions 
as neutral — not as ‘very good’.
4. DISCUSSION
In order to reveal the forms of behavior 
prerequisite for rule-guided moral judgments 
we contrasted four age groups with respect to 
moral decisions. Children aged 3–4, 5–6, 7–9, 
and 10–11 years were presented with 4 moral 
dilemmas in which actions of a human who 
seeks life improvement could result in vital 
harm to another human, domestic animal, wild 
animal, or alien – i.e. creatures with differ-
ent  hypothetical genetic and cultural distance 
to human species. The participants decided 
whether to support an aggressor, or a victim, 
and evaluated the behavior of aggressors. The 
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frequency of helping a victim was found to in-
crease with age, except for the human victim, 
who was less supported in the group of 10–11-
year olds.
The preference of a non-human victim 
to a con-specific aggressor is considered as 
normative behavior, which is supported by 
corresponding disapproval of the aggressor’s 
actions. Therefore, the biologically adaptive 
strategies of supporting in-group members 
may be among prerequisites of the rule-guid-
ed behavior formed during socialization. We 
acknowledge that the dilemmas used in this 
study do not fully correspond to conventional 
definitions of group and kin within the group-
selection and kin-selection theories (West et 
al., 2007b). However, the interaction rate and 
the degree of relatedness to other creatures 
were central to our main propositions, like 
they are central to these theories. We propose 
that the group- and kin-selection theories de-
scribe different aspects of the same process. 
Kin selection theory focuses to a consider-
able extent on how genes influence the devel-
opment of prosocial and altruistic behavior, 
whereas group selection theory focuses more 
on socio-environmental influences.
The age-related increase of the out-
group support frequencies observed here re-
veals specific features of socialization within 
culture. The trend is consistent with the sug-
gestion of the development of moral attitudes 
toward out-group members in problem situ-
ations. Earlier in the ontogeny, children em-
ploy an evolutionarily more ancient behav-
ioral strategy (helping an in-group member), 
whereas at later evolutionary stages, children 
acquire and ‘internalize’ (Vygotski, 1929) 
moral rules from their cultures (Rest et al., 
2000) (in our case, they are presumably based 
on understanding the value of life). It has 
been shown that the attitudes toward in- and 
out-group members differ (e.g., Cunningham 
et al., 2004; Hein et al., 2010; Rilling et al., 
2008). This difference appears early in onto-
genesis— for instance, 10-month-old toddlers 
prefer faces of their race (Kinzler and Spelke, 
2011). Presumably, attitudes toward in- and 
out-group members are formed via moral rules 
that emerged during phylogeny and can be 
fixed in genes and culture (House et al., 2013). 
The preference for unrelated group members 
may therefore be formed within culture early 
in ontogenesis but later than the preference for 
related group members.
The present findings may provide the 
initial basis for explaining kin selection as re-
flecting the first stage of altruism and prosocial 
behavior development in human phylogeny 
and evidence of group selection as reflecting 
the second stage. This suggestion is consistent 
with parochialism being the most ancient type 
of altruism, as expressed in relation to more 
relative group members only and associated 
with hostility to less relative group members 
(Choi and Bowles, 2007). Altruistic help is 
more difficult for infants to understand than 
empathic or instrumental help (Svetlova et al., 
2010), because the former requires more cog-
nitive complexity (see also Rest et al., 2000). 
Moreover, reciprocal altruism appears later 
in the ontogenesis than altruism toward in-
group members in animals (Reznikova, 2011). 
Therefore, we suppose that the reciprocal al-
truism (toward out-group members) is associ-
ated with the growth of intergroup interactions 
and the spread of cooperative actions beyond 
the own group.
Interestingly, the preference for alien 
victims in our study appears at an older age 
than the preference for other non-human spe-
cies (10–11 years old vs. 7–9 years old). The 
contributing factors to this result may be the 
enrichment of subjective experience and a 
dramatic increase in the number of intergroup 
interaction episodes, as well as the growth of 
the number and heterogeneity of members of 
formal and natural groups in modern societies. 
Similar dynamics in racial attitudes was found 
by Quintana (Quintana, 1998). Negative atti-
tudes toward people of other races decrease in 
ontogenesis. We suggest that the development 
of moral attitudes occurs in the direction from 
self and closely related individuals toward 
more distant and unrelated individuals: self, 
family, race, species, and biosphere are treat-
ed as an in-group at successive stages. These 
‘levels’ may have individual duration or scope 
(see below), but follow the same order.
The evaluation of human actions dif-
fered between children making opposite deci-
sions. Those children who helped out-group 
members evaluated human actions as ‘bad’ 
or ‘very bad’, whereas children who helped 
humans evaluated human actions as neutral 
(not as ‘good’ or ‘very good’). We believe that 
these evaluations stem from children having 
internalized the moral rules of their cultures 
and realized the ‘immorality’, wrongness of 
the actions of human aggressors. However, 
children still want to help in-group members 
due to an unconscious ‘relatedness’. Thus, the 
evaluations demonstrate that genetic and envi-
ronmental factors interact in the development 
of altruistic behavior.
If the rule-guided support of the vic-
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tim reflects the development of the moral at-
titudes, then no decrease of victim support 
was to be expected as the age of the group 
increases. However, the frequency of support 
to a human victim in the group of 10–11-year 
olds was significantly lower than in the group 
of 7–9-year olds. This decrease was not ac-
companied by growth in evaluations of ag-
gressor’s actions. The oral explanations given 
after each choice by every participant (analy-
sis not presented here) showed that the 10–11 
year-old participants gave significantly more 
explanations of their choices based on rules 
and conventions, than participants of the other 
age groups. Therefore, the decrease of human 
victim support in the 10–11 age group was due 
to a more detailed knowledge of human social 
life, which is also a sign of socialization, but 
of the type beyond our empirical capacity. The 
in-group member preferences were evident 
in all groups, especially the youngest. This 
ancient moral attitude tempts us to speculate 
that moral might be under major influence of 
the ‘genetic’ factor, whereas interaction with 
the environment primarily defines the range 
of application of moral attitude. Thus, every 
individual expresses moral attitude, but this 
attitude may not involve certain groups due 
to specific socialization conditions (Koonz, 
2003; Sozinov et al., 2015). According to our 
results, this range may start adhering new 
groups of less related creatures as early as 
at the age of 5–6 years. This suggests that it 
is important to introduce moral education in 
early childhood.
Using the terminology of the system-
evolutionary principles that inspired our theo-
retical hypothesis (see Introduction), we con-
clude that the preference for helping related 
group members may have emerged within 
the most ancient systems of individual ex-
perience, whereas the preference for helping 
unrelated group members may have emerged 
within more recently formed systems. 
We consider the results of this investi-
gation as a necessary step to studying moral 
decisions under decreased social control. The 
victim support might be less evident, if the di-
lemmas were presented on an electronic device 
in absence of a grown-up. As a perspective for 
future studies, we also propose that dynamics 
of prosocial decisions may be characterized 
with intercultural differences. Given that even 
simple verbal discrimination task performance 
(Sozinov et al., 2015), as well as social (and 
moral) decisions in grown-ups (Arutyunova 
et al., 2013; Simpson and Willer, 2008) differ 
between cultures, the prosocial behavior may 
develop in culture-specific ways.
5. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that moral de-
cisions in dilemmas confronting in- and out-
group members differ between groups of chil-
dren aged 3 to 11 years old. Older children 
prefer helping unrelated group members more 
frequently than do younger children. Con-
ventionally, the prosocial behavior may have 
emerged either at the earlier stages of evolu-
tion and ontogenesis, as explained by kin se-
lection theory, or the later stages, as explained 
by group selection and other theories of altru-
ism. At the same time, these two descriptions 
may correspond to consecutive stages of de-
velopment.
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